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Hagberg: Usury--Insurance--Requiring Borrower to Take Life Insurance Polic

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

Thus the Georgia court requires that the value of the land
and the value and extent of the services be alleged in the bill to
enable the chancellor to determine the question of adequacy.8 That
notion is hardly persuasive. If the burden is imposed on the defendant he can allege the facts relative to adequacy of consideration. The very language of the Georgia Code, that "mere inadequacy .. . . may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific
performance", seems to assume that adequacy is not a part of
plaintiff's case since the court "may" rely on inadequacy to deny
relief. The only sound basis for relying on inadequacy of consideration in resisting specific performance is a combination of
unfairness and hardship,' and it depends upon the particular
transaction whether inadequacy even suggests such a combination.
If the plaintiff has a binding contract supported by a consideration and the legal remedy is inadequate it seems both logical and
just to impose the burden of establishing special objections to
specific relief upon the defendant.n
-EDWARD S. BOCK, JR.

USURY

-

INSURANCE -

REQUIRING BORROWER TO TAKE LIFE

Proceedings
were begun to enjoin a sale under a deed of trust and to purge
INSURANCE POLICY TO BE USED AS COLLATERAL. -

mere inadequacy of price, independent of other circumstances, is not of itself
stay the exercise of its
sufficient to set aside a transaction, yet it may .....
How(equity's) power to enforce the specific performance of a contract."
ever, the court did not depend upon mere inadequacy of consideration alone.
'In addition to the principal case see Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566,
104 S. E. 414 (1920); Potts v. Mathis, 147 Ga. 495, 100 S. E. 110 (1919).
"In the absence of allegations.., as to the value of the lands, or of the value
and extent of the services alleged as the consideration of the contract, it is
impossible for a court to determine whether the services performed constituted
an adequate or grossly inadequate price for the estate of the person with whom
the alleged contract was made; nor could it be determined, in the absence of
such essentials, whether the contract was unfair, or unjust, or against good conscience." Flood v. Templeton, 148 Cal. 374, 83 Pac. 148 (1905) (The complaint
or petition must show the adequacy of the consideration). Contra: Finlen v.
Heinze, supra n. 6 (The burden of proof is on the party resisting specific
performance, and though inadequacy of consideration alone is a defense,
complete in itself, adequacy of the price or consideration need not be
alleged); Saint v. Beal, supra n. 3.
Harrison v. Town, 17 Mo. 237 (1852), quoted in WALSH, Equity
0See
(1930) 482, n. 34.
"There is no sound reason why equity should refuse to enforce a contract
under seal enforceable at law but that is the case. See Pound, Consideration
in ,quity (1919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 667. Cf. Fletcher v. Pletcher, 4 Hare 67
(1844).
Bauermeister v. Sullivan, 87 Ind. App. 628, 160 N. E. 105 (1928).
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the loan secured thereby of usury. Lending insurance company
had required the borrower to take out an insurance policy and
assign the same to the lender, in addition to the security provided
by a deed of trust. The loan was made at a legal rate of interest,
and the premiums were those regularly charged against non-borrowing customers. Held: The loan was not usurious. Heaberlin
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Go.
Mhere the lender requires the borrower to take out insurance
and assign the policy to the lender as additional security for a
loan, provided the policy be obtained from a third party and
premiums paid to that third party, the loan is not usurious?
Where, however, the insurance is underwritten by the lender,
there are two conflicting lines of decisions. One holds that such
a requirement does not constitute usury, at least when the policy
is actually issued at the same rate and on the same terms as
The reasoning in these cases
policies issued to non-borrowers?
has its basis in the belief that the subject matter of the contract
is divisible, since if the insured bad died immediately after the
policy were issued, the insurance company would have been liable
on the policy.' M reover, tlre insurance is held to -be for the benefit of the insured, rather than simply a bonus to the insurance
company lender, which actually bears a risk in proportion to the
amount of the policy? This tends somewhat to slur over the reality that life insurance, while possessing no doubt an element of
indemnity, may nevertheless be primarily a contract of investment? Still, the courts say the borrower receives ample consideration for his premiums." Apparently, the addition by the insurer
of a thirty per cent. "loading charge", over and above the net
'171 S. E. 419 (W. Va. 1933).
2
Niles v. Kavanagh, 179 Cal. 98, 175 Pac. 462 (1918). See Union Central
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillard, 63 Ohio St. 478, 492, 59 N. E. 230, 232, 53 L. R.
A. 462 (1900) reversing 16 Ohio C. C. 434 (1898).
'Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson Silk Mfg. Co., 25 N. J. Eq. 160
(1874); Homeopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Crane, 25 N. J. Eq. 418 (1874);
Lane v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 46 N. J. Eq. 318, 19 Atl. 618 (1889),
aff'g 46 N. J. Eq. 316, 19 Atl. 617 (1889); Utica Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 3
Wend. 296 (N. Y. 1829); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 55
How. Prac. 393 (N. Y. 1878); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Morrow, 16
Ohio C. C. 351, 8 Ohio C. D. 419 (1898), aff'd without opinion in 61 Ohio
St. 661, 57 N. E. 1133 (1900); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Hilliard,
supra n. 2; Edinburgh Life Assur. Co. v. Graham, 19 N. C. Q. B. 581 (1860);
Downes v. Green, 12 M. & W. 481, 152 Eng. Rep. 1287 (1844).
'Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Morrow, supra n. 3.
5
Downes v. Green, supra n. 3.
OVANCE ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 123.
'John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, supra n. 3.
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premium as fixed by conservative actuarial estimate,' is not worthy
of judicial notice. But if the insurance be used obviously as a
shift or device to exact usury, the transaction will then be declared
usurious.' As regards such decisions the analogy may fairly be
drawn of a loan transaction requiring the borrower to purchase
property at an excessive price; courts uniformly rebuke the illconcealed usury.'
The other line of decisions is to the effect that the insurance
stipulation renders the arrangement usurious.'
The loan and
policy blend into one transaction; and the company makes a profit
thereby.'
It is not even necessary to show that the premiums
charged were unreasonable; it will be presumed that the company
benefits materially through its insurance activity. If such profit
be in excess of the legal rate allowed for the loan there is usury.
The instant case is peculiarly of interest in that Woods, J.,
in formulating the common law result for West Virginia seemed
to reason by analogy from a North Carolina statute declaratory
of the social policy in this regard.1' The court thus determined
8 See, for the basis of the estimate of net premiums, KXGHT, ADVANCED
LnPE INSURANCE (1926), and HUEBNER, LiFr INSURANCE (1925) cc. 12-15.
OHomeopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Crane, supra n. 3 (while the bona fides
of the transaction was questioned, there was not enough evidence to convince
the court of the exiatence of an agreement to discontinue the policy, after
payment of the first premium. Semble, the court would otherwise have held
the load usurious); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, supra n. 3
(The court adverted to cases in which the issuing of the policy was resorted
to as a disguise to cloak over the attempted usury, yet distinguished the
pending litigation on its facts.)
"Gibson v. Fristoe, 1 Call. 62, 1 Am. Dec. 502 (Va. 1797); Watkins v.
Taylor, 2 Munf. 424, 5 Am. Dec. 486 (Va. 1811); Stribling v. Bank, 5 Rand.
132, 19 L. R. A. 223 n. (Va. 1827); Selby v. Morgan, 3 Leigh 577 (1832);
Bank of Valley v. Stribling, 7 Leigh 26, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 230 (Va. 1836).
n Clague v. Creditors, 2 La. 114, 29 Am. Dec. 300 (1830), (The court
attempted to follow what was really non-edstent New York case law. As
to New York authorities, see n. 3, supra; Moore v. Union Mut. Lifo Ins.
Co., Fed. Cas. No. 9,777 (C. C. D. Neb. 1876), (Borrower was required to
procure insurance for himself and others, pay a three per cent. commission
upon the loan, plus an additional sum alleged to be for services rendered);
Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Kittle, 2 Fed. 113 (C. C. Neb. 1880);
National Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 7 Fed. 805 (C. C. Iowa 1881); Miller v.
Life Ins. Co., 118 N. C. 612, 24 S. E. 484, 51 Am. St. Rep. 741 (1896) (The
court here assumed the Kittle case, supzra, to represent the weight of
authority) ; Roberts v. Ins. Co., 118 N. C. 429, 24 S.E. 780 (1896); (N. C.
Pub. Laws, 1915, c. 8, N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1927) § 6291, abrogated
the decisions regarding such transactions, by enacting that if the premiums
were no greater than those charged non-borrowers, there was no usury);
Brower v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 86 Fed. 748 (C. 0. W. D. N. C. 1898).
"Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Kittle, supra n. 9; National Life Ins.
Co. v. Harvey, supra n. 9.
INational Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, supra n. 9.
u See Pound, Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 HARv. L. BEv. 383,
395; "(Courts) .... might receive it, (legislation), fully into the body of
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that the sounder principles lay in those authorities which hold
that the transaction is not usurious. After all, the borrower is
obliged merely to furnish additional security; it is scarcely likely
that local usury laws have been intended to forbid such a relatively harmless practice.' It is true that a requirement to take out
insurance with the lender may be a clever scheme for selling insurance, still that consideration should bear no weight as an argument based on usury. Perhaps there is another factor in this
line of cases, namely, a judicial belief that fair collateral advantages should be upheld. Clearly, one now discerns a growing
tendency to approve and enforce collateral stipulations" that were
once held to be "clogs on the equity of redemption" in mortgages."'
Though the insurance policy may properly be held to typify a
contract of adhesion,' and, therefore, one to be construed most
narrowly against the insurance company lender, there is no such
strong social interest in usury as to invalidate the present security transaction.
-R.

E. HAGBERG.

VERDICT

JUROR'S ASSENT WHAT CONSTITUTES. - In the
trial of a recent criminal case, juror no. 12 told the court that
he feared -for his health and life if he had to continue in jury
service. Medical examination disclosed that he was suffering only
physical discomfort which would not affect his capacity as a juror.
He continued in jury service, and a verdict of guilty was rendered. On the poll, all of the jurors agreed to the verdict. In
answer to further questions asked him by the court concerning
his physical condition, juror no. 12 said that he agreed in order
to escape further confinement and suffering, although he did not
believe that the defendants were guilty. The verdict was then
recorded over the defendants' objection, and a new trial was re-

the law to be reasoned from analogy the same as any other rule of
law
)"
1 0 ....
The excess profit to the lender is hardly an evil of such magnitude as to
outweigh advantages of free capital investment in West Virginia.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, supra n. 3 (The theory of
the court is that the business of the company is to insure lives. Since its
surplus funds must be invested it is not unreasonable to confine its loans
to policy-holders; in other words, the company may validly insist upon fair
reciprocity).
17 See Williams, Clogging the Equity of Bedemption (1933)
40 W. VA. L.
Q. "031,
50.
See Vance, supra n. 6, pp. 201, 215.
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